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THE LAW-MAIIUNG ROLE0F THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA- RAIEP®RTEUR'S SYNTHESIS
Peter W. Hogg*
Toronto
The adoption ofthe Charter ofRights in 1982 thrustanew role on theSupreme Court
ofCanada. The Courtwas required to resolve issues that wouldformerly have been
regarded as matters ofpolicyfor the legislative bodies. Thisarticleshows thatthe new
policy-making role of the Court has carried over into non-Charter fields, such as
federalism, evidence, administrative law, torts, andfamily law.
L'adoption en 1982 de la Chartedes droitsabrusquement imposé un nouveau rôle
à la Cour suprême du Canada . La Cour a dû résoudre des questions qui
auparavant étaient considérées comme des enjeux politiques relevant des corps
législatifs. Cet article montre que ce nouveau rôlepolitique de la Cours'estétendu
à des domaines hors de la Charte, tels que le fédéralisme, la, preuve, le droit
administratif, la responsabilité délictuelle, et le droit de lafamille.
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I. Introduction
This paper is a written and somewhat expanded version of the Rapporteur's
summary which was delivered orally at the end of the Supreme Court of
Canada's 125th Anniversary Conference .
This Conference celebrated the 125th anniversary oftheSupreme Court of
Canada. The big events in that history are: the establishment of the Court in
1875; the abolition ofappeals to the Privy Council in 1949; the abolition ofmost
"as of right" appeals in civil cases in 1975 ; and the adoption of the Canadian
Charter of Rights andFreedoms in 1982. It is the last event that has dominated
the recent history .ofthe Court. The adoption of the Charter of Rights thrust on
the Court anew role, namely, that of judicial review in the service of civil
PeterW. Hogg, Q.C., ofOsgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Ontario.
Inthe preparation of this paper, I acknowledge thehelp ofProfessor Sujit Choudhry of the
Faculty of Law of the University of Toronto.
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liberties . The Court entered on that new role with zeal, although it required a
morepolicy-based style ofdecision-making than has been traditional for courts
in Canada . And that new style of decision-making has spilled over into the
Court's work in non-constitutional fields as well .
The theme that underlies the Conference, and is the topic ofthis paper, is the
new law-making power of the Court. By law-making power, I do not refer to the
factthatjudges make new law whenever they decide anovelcase. Thathas always
beentrue (although not always acknowledged) . WhatIreferto is decision-making
thathas twocharacteristics : (1) explicit relianceby the Courton considerations that
are notlegalrules, legalprinciples orlegalpolicies ; and(2) explicitacknowledgment
by the Court that the Court does on occasion have to design and apply a new law .
II . The Charter ofRights
The adoption of the Charter of Rights required the Supreme Court of Canada
(andthe lowercourts) to interpretanew constitutional instrument . t TheCharter
used language that was unfamiliar to Canadianjudges and that was difficult to
interpret, requiring consideration of the jurisprudence and literature of the
United States and other countries with bills of rights, as well as the decisions of
international tribunals and the theoretical literature on the nature ofrights . This
was a much wider range of sources than the Court was accustomed to consult,
and it did not carry any easy answers for the Court because of the unique
structure of the Canadian Charter, the unique circumstances of Canadian
society, and the unsatisfactory state of the jurisprudence of otherjurisdictions .
Forallthese reasons, the definitionofequality has provedthe most intractable?
IftheCharter ofRights hadcalled forno more than the interpretation of the
new guaranteed rights, it would have been a considerable new enterprise . But
section 1 of the Charter authorized the limitation of rights by legislation that
qualified as a "reasonable" limit that could be "demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society" . This limitation clause also had to be applied, and of
courseit was relied on by government in nearly every case where a violation of
aguaranteedrightwas found . TheCourt developedastructure forthe application
of section 1,3 but that structure inevitably called for the balancing of policy
I In this symposium, seeL.E. Weimib, "TheInfluence oftheCharter on SupremeCourt
Thinking and Methodology" infra 699 ; S.L. Martin, "Equality and the Balance between
IndividualRights and Social Goals" infra 299; K. Roach, "Constitutional andCommonLaw
Dialogues between the Supreme Court andCanadian Legislatures" infra 481 ; P.J . Monahan,
"The Supreme Court of Canada in the 21st Century" infra 374.
'- The latest iteration of the definition ofequality is to be found in Lawv. Canada,
199911 S.C.R . 497 . It attempts to synthesize a numberofconflicting judicial approaches
to the topic, resulting in atest that is so complicated, vague and confusing that it is unlikely
to be the last word .
The seminal decision is R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S .C.R . 103, which lays down a four-
part test, ofwhichthe dispositive elements are the assessment ofthelegislative objective and
the assessment ofwhether the objective couldhavebeen accomplished by lessdrastic means .
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considerations that hadpreviously been seen as exclusively the province ofthe
legislative branch . After determining that a statute infringed a guaranteedright,
the Court had to weigh the importance of the objective of the statute, and
determine whether in principle that objective could justify the limiting of the
right. Then the Court had to consider the availability of other legislative
instruments that could achieve the same objective, but withless impairment of
the right. The Supreme Court of Canadahadnever before hadsuch an explicitly
legislative role to weigh and balance competing policies .
In thinking about the changes wrought by the Charter of Rights, we must
not forget that section 35,of the Constitution Act, 1982, a provision that is
technically outside the Charter (which ends at, section 34), "recognized and
affirmed" the "existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of
Canada". This vague language has also 'proved extraordinarily difficult to
interpret, requiring the Court to give definition to aboriginal rights, including
aboriginal title to land, as well as to treaty rights .4 The pre-1982jurisprudence
on these topics was scanty and undeveloped . Moreover, afterthe Court decided
thatsection 35 didindeedconstitute a constitutional guarantee ofaboriginal and
treaty rights (which was not perfectly clear from the phrase "recognized and
affirmed in section 35), the Courthad to decide whether those rights should on
occasion have to yield to other values, for example, the conservation ofnatural
resources. TheCourt answered this question yes, and went on to develop tests
of justification that were similar, to. the tests developed for section 1 of the
Charters Once again, anexplicit weighing andbalancing oflegislativepolicies
was called for.
The role ofjudicial review under the Charter ofRights was notone that the
Supreme Court of Canada could have avoided . The text and the legislative
history of the Constitution Act, 1982 clearly contemplated its supremacy over
ordinary statute law, andgave the task o£ application to the courts . What was
rather surprising was the enthusiasm with which the Court embraced its new
role . In the 18 years since the adoption of the Charter, 64 statutory provisions
have been struck down, andamuch. larger number ofactions by police officers
or government officias have been annulled .6 Moreover, the Court has not
adhered tothosecounsels ofproceduralrestraint thatAlexanderBickelfamously
described as the "passive virtues" .7 The Court has developed no doctrine of
4 In this symposium, seeJ. Borrows, "UncertainCitizens: AborigginalPeoples and
the Supreme Court" supra 15 .
5, The seminal decision is R. v., Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, which establishesthe
frameworkfortheapplication ofs. 35 and elaboratesthejustificatory testforlaws that limit
aboriginal or treaty rights .
6 P.J. Monahan, supra note 2.
7 A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (YaleU.P . NewHaven,2nd ed., 1986).
K. Roach, supra note 2, urges the Court to adopt the passive virtues, as does Monahan,




ripeness;$ mootness rarely defeats proceedings ;9 lack of standing also rarely
defeats proceedings (because of generous discretionary public interest
standing) ; 10 public interest intervenors are often admitted to appeals (even
when they are antagonistic to a criminal defendant) ; I I statutes are occasionally
struck down on the basis of hypothetical facts that bear no resemblance to the
facts before the Court;12 sweeping constitutional rulings are occasionally
issued in obiter dicta ; 13 and statutes are occasionally directly amended by the
Court simply "severing" words that create a constitutional defect or even
"reading in" new language that would cure the constitutional defect . 14
A review of the Supreme Court of Canada's Charterjurisprudence reveals
an eagerness to seize and decide constitutional issues . This is the oppositeof the
passive virtues advocatedby Professor Bickel . The Court's active approach can
be justified on the ground that it is wasteful of judicial time not to decide
constitutional issues once they have been fully argued before the Court. No
doubt as well, the Court is anxious to settle controverted issues, rather than
leaving thelaw uncertain, which is the effectof adherence tothe passivevirtues .
Ofcourse, Bickel'spoint is that the law is ultimately settled more carefully, and
the settlement is likely to be more acceptable and more stable if the Courtwaits
until its intervention cannot be avoided . It is not the purpose of this paper to
debate the wisdom ofthe passive virtues, but simply to report that the Court's
practice gives little weight to them. The Court has assumed an active law-
making rolerather than the more limited adjudicatory role thatwouldhavebeen
taken for granted thirty years ago .
III . Federalism
The constitutional law of federalism, or division of powers, 15 did not undergo
an upheaval in 1982, when the Charter of Rights was adopted . 16 For the
Supreme CourtofCanada, the mostimportantevent wasthe abolition ofappeals
s P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law ofCanada (Carswell, Toronto, 4th ed.,1997), sec . 56 .4.
9 Ibid., sec. 56 .3 .
to Ibid., sec . 56.2(d) .
11 Ibid., sec . 56 .6 .
12 E.g ., R. v . Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (striking down minimum sentence for
importing drugs) ; R. v . Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (striking down prohibition of
previously convicted sexual offenders from loitering in playgrounds) .
13 E.g., R. v.Brydges, [199011 S.C.R . 190 (instructing police officers to warn arrested
persons of the availability of free duty counsel and legal aid) ; Delgamuukw v. B. C_, [1997]
3 S.C.R. 1010 (defining aboriginal title) .
14 Hogg, supra note 7, above, sees. 37.1 (e) and (f) provide examples of severance and
reading in.
is In this symposium, see A.W . MacKay, "The Supreme Court of Canada and
Federalism: Does\ShouldAnyone Care Anymore?" itia241 ; M . Trebilcock, "TheCourtand
Economic Regulation" infra 542.
16 The Constitution Act, 1982, by Part V, provided new amending procedures, and,
by ss.50 and 51, added a new s . 92A and Sixth Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1867 .
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to the Privy Council in 1949 . The Privy Council had drawn very narrow
boundaries around the principal powers ofthe federal Parliament-the powers
to legislate in relation to -peace, order, and good government, trade and
commerce andcriminal law. TheSupremeCourt ofCanada has expanded those
powers, the mostimportanteffects ofwhich are to allow the federal Parliament
arole intheregulation ofthe environment)7 andthe regulationofcompetition.18
These arehardly surprising orrevolutionary outcomes . 19 Onthe whole, balance
has been the watchword of the Court's federalism cases, and balance means
preserving the main elements of the federal division of powers_ that were
inherited in 1949. Even the Labour Conventions case20 has so :far survived,
although it denies to the Parliament the power to implement international
treaties .
But the Supreme Court is still capable of extraordinary law-making-in
federalism cases -provided it is in the service of balance . The Patriation
Reference of 198121 invented a new constitutional convention to regulate the
amendment of the constitution in order to give a role to the provinces that was
at that time (before the Constitution Act, 1982) denied them by law. And the
Secession Reference of 199822 invented a constitutional duty to negotiate
secession with a province that had held areferendum in favour ofsecession in
order to soften the ruling that Qu6bec hadno right to secede unilaterally . Both
of these decisions established new rules to govern the federation in times of
crisis . The first forced the federal government of Prime Minister Trudeau to
negotiate a compromise with the provinces who were opposed to his plan to
patriate the constitution and introduce a new Charter of Rights and amending
procedures .z 3 Thesecond has not yet beenputto the test, becauseno referendum
on Quebec separation has received a majority vote, but if a majority were to be
securedin afuturereferendum, the Secession Reference would drastically limit
the options legally open to the Government of Canada .
17 See R. v . Crown Zellerbach, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (peace, order, and good
government); R. v. Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (criminal law power) .
18 General Motors v . City National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.E.R. 641 (trade and
commerce) .
19 Perhaps the most innovative of the federalism decisions are De Savoye v.
Morguard Investments, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 .andHunt v . T & N, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289,
which (despite the absence of a full faith and credit clause in the Canadian constitution)
require provinces to give full faith and credit to the judicialdecisions ofotherprovinces .
The holdings are important, and in addition the cases probably alsopresage alarger federal
role in guaranteeing mobility ofpersons and economic factors throughout the country.
20 A.G. Can. v . A.G.Ont(Labour Conventions), [1937] A.C . 326 .
21 Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 .
22 Re Secession ofQuebec, [199,8] 2 S.C.R. 217 .
23 The story is told in Hogg, supra note 9, above, ch . 4 .
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IV. Evidence
The Charter of Rights, by section 24(2), authorizes the exclusion of evidence
obtained in breach of the Charter where the admission of the evidence would
bring the administration ofjustice into disrepute . This remedy has been applied
by the Supreme Court of Canada in many cases, and the Court has even
developed arigidrule ofexclusion for whattheCourtdescribes as "conscriptive"
evidence . Despitetheadjective "conscriptive", mostofthecases haveconcerned
confessions or other evidence offered voluntarily by the accused, and in all the
casesthe evidence was utterlyreliable andcould nothaveproducedamiscarriage
of justice. This particular rule of exclusion is another example of the Court's
activism in enforcement of the Charter of Rights . 24 In criminal cases, the
Charterhas caused other modifications of the law of evidence in service of the
accused's right to full answer and defence,25 a right which has to be balanced
with the complainant's right to privacy and to the equality concerns of female
victims of crime26
®f course, evidentiary issues in criminal cases do not always implicate the
Charter of Rights, and in civil cases, the Charter is usually inapplicable?? The
interesting pointforthe purpose ofthis paper is the degreeto whichthe Supreme
Court of Canada has transformed the law of evidence when no Charter issue
arises . For example, the Court has abolished ancient rules respecting hearsay
evidence, similar fact evidence and collateral facts evidence and substituted
guidelines forthe use ofdiscretionby trialjudges28 Such sweeping reforms of
common law rules would have called for a statute twenty years ago . Now the
Court can just do it!
V . Administrative Law
The Charter of Rights has not had much direct influence on administrative
law,29 because the Charter does not protect property rights and most
administrative tribunals or officials do not dispose of the "life, liberty and
24 In this symposium, see D.M . Paciocco, "Balancing the Rights ofthe Individual
and Society in matters ofTruth and Proof' infra 426.
25 E.g ., R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R . 577 (striking down rape-shield provisions
restricting right of accused to question complainant about past sexual activity) ; R. v.
Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R . 326 (holding that accused entitled to full disclosure from
Crown) .
26 E.g., R. v. O'Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 ; R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R . 668
(regulating access by accused to complainants' therapeutic records) .
27 RWDSUv. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S .C.R. 573 .
28 The story is told by Paciocco, supra note 25 .
29 In this symposium, see H.W. MacLauchlan, "Transforming Administrative Law :
The Didactic Role of the Supreme Court of Canada infra 281 ; D.J . Mullan, "The Court
and Tribunals" infra 399 .
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security oftheperson",thatis guaranteedby section7 . Andyet ; even ifoutcomes
have not changed markedly, the rules of administrative law-like the rules of
evidence-have been transformed by the Supreme Court of Canada . With
respect to substantive review, the concept ofjurisdiction, once the centrepiece
of judicial review of administrative discretion, has been virtually replaced by
three standards of review-patent unreasonableness, unreasonableness and
correctness-with the Court using a "functional and pragmatic" approach to
determine which standard to apply . With respect to procedural review, the
concepts ofthe duty to actjudicially andtherules ofnatural justice, which were
the centerpieces of judicial review for procedural error, have been virtually
replaced by a duty of fairness, à concept which is also applied in a "functional
and pragmatic" manner.30'
VI. Torts
The Charter of Rights has had very little direct influence on the law of torts,
because the Supreme Court of Canada held in the Dolphin Delivery case
(1986)3 1 that the element of governmental action was absent from a tort action
between private parties (despite the role of the state in administering sanctions
for non-compliance with court orders) . Even where "Charter values" such as
freedom ofexpression are implicated, the Court has been reluctant to apply the
Charter to the law of torts . Even the law of defamation, which limits freedom
of expression, has not been modified by the Court, not even to protect the right
of the media to criticize public officials . 32 This is one area where the general
tendency of the Court to. active and expansive application of the Charter is not
evident .
Nevertheless, as _with the law of evidence and administrative law, the
Supreme Court ofCanada, withoutexplicitlyinvoking the Charter orits values,
hasmoved boldly toreshape the law oftorts . In the law ofnegligence, theCourt
adopted the expansive duty of care stipulated in Anns v. Merton London
Borough Council (1978)1 33 and continued to apply the rule afterits rejection by
theHouse of Lords and the High Court ofAustralia . The rule in Anns explicitly
required the Court to extend the duty of care to everyone at risk of harm in the
reasonable contemplation ofthe defendant, and to limit thatbroad duty on the
basis of "considerations" that may be applicable in a particular setting or
context . The explicit reference to considerations, which could only mean
considerations ofpolicy; invited a law-makingrolefor the Court. With thatself-
30 The story is told by MacLauchlan, supra note 30, above, andMullan, supra note
30, above, whodifferonhowradical is the difference inoutcomes(asopposed to articulated
rules) .
31 Supra note 28, above .
32 Trill v . Church ofScientology, [19,9512 S.C.R_ 1130, rejecting arguments based
on judicial modifications of the common law, .rules in the United States and Australia . (I
disclose that I was one of the counsel urging such a modification on the Court .)




assumed mandate, the Court has expanded the categories of recoverable
economic loss ; has held that parties to a contract may be concurrently liable to
each otherin tort ; has held that builders of defective buildings, bridges or other
structures owedutiesto subsequentpurchasers and users for the costs ofrepairs ;
and has held governmentliable for economic loss that couldhave been avoided
by the more diligent use of statutory powers .34
These and other developments in the law of torts35 have taken place with
explicit reference to policy considerations that would traditionally have been
seen as outside the proper scope ofjudicial reasoning, and indeed outside the
scopeofjudicial competence. Theabilityofthe parties toinsure, the ability to pass
on costs to customers, the likely deterrent effect of tort liability onbehaviour and
thepotentialextent ofliability are among the factors nowroutinelyreviewedby the
Court in deciding tort cases . Whether judges have the information and training to
pass judgment on these complex issues is open to question . No doubt, factors of
thesekinds have always influenced the development oftort doctrine byjudges, but
the frankness with whichthey arenow acknowledged andthereadiness to develop
new doctrine are certainly new .
In OrdonEstatev . Grail(1998),36 twoboating accidents that resulted in death
and injury gave rise to four negligence actions . Although the accidents concerned
pleasure boats on lakes in Ontario, because the accidents occurred in navigable
waters, thegoverning law was federal maritimelaw . However, the plaintiffs in the
actions attempted to rely on several Ontario statutes, which permitted negligence
claimstobebroughtbythe siblingsofadeceasedorinjured victim,whichpermitted
the recovery of damages for the loss of guidance, care and companionship of a
deceased or injured victim, and which permitted apportionment of damages in
cases of contributory negligence (rather than barring the plaintiff's action) . These
causes ofactionwereunavailable under federalmaritime law . The Supreme Court
ofCanada held that, as a matter of constitutional law, none ofthe Ontario statutes
could apply to a maritime negligence case . Did this mean that the unfortunate
plaintiffs were denied causes ofaction in tort that had been generally adopted into
provincial law, but had never been adopted in the Canada Shipping Act or other
federal legislation? No, said the Court, and, in an extraordinary display ofjudicial
activism, the Court "reformed" the maritime law to bring it into line with the
provincial law. In that way, reforms to the law oftorts that had required legislation
in every otherjurisdiction that had adopted them, were simply adopted into federal
maritime law by the Court .37 .
34 The story is toldby L. Mar, `Judicial Activismin PrivateLaw" infra 215 .
35 E.g.,thevicariousliabilityofemployersforunauthorizedsexualwrongdoingbyemployees :
Mar, supra note 35, above, Ibid.
36 [199813 S.C.R. 437 .
37 The one "reform"that the Court refused to adoptinto maritimelawwas the expansion of
eligible dependantsin fatal accidentclaims toinclude siblings . Parliamenthad spoken onthis issue,
becausetheCanadaShipping Actcontained a list ofeligibledependantsthatdidnotinclude siblings.
`ForUsCourttoreform thelawtoexpandthe class wouldbetoeffect a legislative andnot ajudicial
changeinthelaw" : para.106 . Thisreasoning didnotdetertheCourtfrom the other reforms, all of
which hadrequired legislation for their accomplishment in other jurisdictions.
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VII. Family Law
It is a similar story with family law. The Charter of Rights has had some
influence, to be sure, especially theequality guarantee, which has enlarged the
family to include common-law relationships38 and same-sex relationships.39
And, of course, the de-criminalization of abortion was dictated by a decision
based on the Charter.40 Butmost ofthe conflict within or about families is not
touchedby the Charter atall, andindeedthe Court hasrefused to decide custody
issues on the basis of the "right" of a parent, taking the view that it is the best
interests ofthe childthat should always be dispositive. Andyet,family law, like
evidence, administrative law and torts, has _been transformed by the post-
Charter Supreme Court of Canada41 Dean Harvison Young, in her paper for
this symposium, quotes from an article by L'Heureux-Dubé J., who says :42
In Canada, since the advent of the Charter, it is no longer possible to deny that, in
deciding questions of law or policy, judges essentially perform an active law and
policy-making role rather than passively recognizing or discovering law that is
dictated by precedent or principle .
As Dean Harvison Young comments, this statement wouldseem unsurprising
if it concerned law to which the Charter applies. ButL'Heureux-Dubé J. was
talking about issues of family law that are outside the ambit of the Charter.
VIII . Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Canada has become a powerful lawmaker, not just in
constitutional law, but in public law generally and in private law. That is a fact
of political life that Canadians have been ;_ slow to recognize, although any
attentive reader of the newspapers would have noticed that there are very few
controversial issues in Canadian politics upon which the Court has not had. to
rule. Conflicts of interests nowtend to be framed as conflicts ofrights, and the
Court is expected to adjudicate43 In a democratic society, the exercise of such
power by non-elected judges raises issues of legitimacy even for those who
generally agree with the Court's outcomes . But for critics of the left44 and the
right, 45 who (interestingly enough) both regard the Court's outcomes as
38 Miron v. Trudel, [199512 S.C.R. 418.
39 Mv. H, [199912 S.C.R. 203.
40 R. v . Morgentaler, [19881 .1 S.C.R. 30.
41 The story is told by A. Harvison Young, infra 749.
42 Ibid.
43 M. Ignatieff, "Challenges for the Future" infra 209.
44 E.g .,M. Mandel, The Charter ofRights and the Legalization ofPolitics in Canada
(1994) ; A. Petter and A. Hutchinson, "Rights in Conflict: The Dilemma of Charter
Legitimacy" (1989) 23 UB.C.L. Rev. 531.
45 E.g ., F.L. Morton andR. Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party




frequently (or even systemically) adverse, the problem of legitimacy is even
more acute .
As this is written, there seems to be no general public concern about the
legitimacy of the Supreme Court of Canada and its decisions . Public polling
usually reports ahigh degree of satisfaction with the Supreme Courtof Canada .
The legitimacy debate is mainly confined to academic circles, and only
occasionally spills over into the media or is taken up by politicians . That does
notmake theconcern atrivialone,becausepublic perceptions canchange . What
can be done to reinforce thelegitimacy ofthe Supreme Court of Canada? At the
political level, legitimacy is a powerful argument for a more transparent and
public appointing process for thejudges of the Court . At the level of the Court
itself, clear writing and helpful communication with the media is obviously
essential to reduce the level ofjournalistic misunderstandings .
The Court should also do its best to write opinions that leave room for the
competent legislative body to enactremedial legislation, so that the democratic
process, admittedly influenced by the Court, has the last word. This is not a
problemindealing withnon-constitutional issues, wherethecompetentlegislative
body always has the choice of replacing judicially-created doctrine of which it
disapproves, buteven whenthe Courtrules that aparticular outcome is required
by the constitutionthere are oftenchoices available to the competent legislative
body, including in many cases (for example, through sections 1 or 33 of the
Charter) the avoidance or reversal of the decision .46 Indeed, the idea that the
Court, although issuing decisions that bind governments and legislatures, is in
practice engaged in a kind of "dialogue" with governments and legislatures is
onethat is supportedby empirical evidence4 7 Where elected legislative bodies
retain an important and often decisive role, the burden of (and blame for)
decision-making is shared between the Supreme Court of Canada and the
legislativebodies, and there is no way thatjudicial decisions can get too far out
of step with public opinion . That may be the best safeguard of the Court's
legitimacy .
46 See P.W . Hogg and A.A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue between Courts and
Legislatures" (1997) 35 Osg. Hall L.J. 75 . In this symposium, the idea of dialogue as a
partial answer to concerns about legitimacy is explored in Monahan, supra note 2, above
and Roach, supra note 2, above .
47 Ibid.
